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We develop a dynamic incomplete-markets model of entrepreneurial firms, and demon-
strate the implications of nondiversifiable risks for entrepreneurs’ interdependent con-
sumption, portfolio allocation, financing, investment, and business exit decisions. We
characterize the optimal capital structure via a generalized tradeoff model where risky debt
provides significant diversification benefits. Nondiversifiable risks have several important
implications: More risk-averse entrepreneurs default earlier, but choose higher leverage;
lack of diversification causes entrepreneurial firms to underinvest relative to public firms,
and risky debt partially alleviates this problem; and entrepreneurial risk aversion can over-
turn the risk-shifting incentives induced by risky debt. We also analytically characterize
the idiosyncratic risk premium. (JEL G11, G31, E20)
Lack of diversification is one of the defining characteristics of entrepreneur-
ship. Numerous empirical studies have documented that (i) active businesses
account for a large fraction of entrepreneurs’ total wealth; and (ii)
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Entrepreneurial Finance and Nondiversifiable Risk
entrepreneurial firms tend to have highly concentrated ownership.1 Concen-
trated ownership is a natural way to provide proper incentives for the en-
trepreneur, as implied by standard agency and informational asymmetry
theories.2 Accordingly, the main sources of financing for private businesses
are inside equity and outside debt (see Heaton and Lucas 2004 and Robb and
Robinson 2009 for U.S. evidence, and Brav 2009 for UK evidence).
Motivated by both the empirical evidence and micro-theory, we provide a
first dynamic incomplete-markets model that explicitly incorporates the effects
of nondiversifiable risk on the valuation and intertemporal decision making
(investment, financing, business exit) for an entrepreneurial firm. We achieve
this objective by unifying a workhorse dynamic capital structure model (e.g.,
Leland 1994) with models of incomplete-markets consumption smoothing/
precautionary saving (e.g., Friedman 1957; Hall 1978; Deaton 1991) and
dynamic consumption/portfolio choice (e.g., Merton 1971). We show that
nondiversifiable business risk generates quantitatively significant effects on
dynamic capital budgeting, financing, business exits, and valuation of
entrepreneurial firms. The model also provides a range of novel empirical
predictions.
What determines the optimal amount of debt to issue? Due to market in-
completeness, the diversification benefit of risky debt becomes a key factor in
addition to the standard tradeoff between tax benefits and costs of financial
distress. This role of risky debt has been studied in earlier papers. For exam-
ple, Zame (1993) argues that risky debt has the advantage in helping complete
the markets, and Heaton and Lucas (2004) provide the first model of the di-
versification benefits of risky debt for entrepreneurial firms in a static setting,
and analyze the interactions among capital budgeting, capital structure, and
portfolio choice for the entrepreneur.
We take the insight of Heaton and Lucas to a dynamic setting, and in-
corporate business exit (cash-out), outside equity, investment/project choice,
and tax considerations for the entrepreneurial firm. These features not only
make the model more realistic, but highlight the impact of market incomplete-
ness on a wide range of firm decisions. For example, like default, the option
to cash out also helps complete the markets and can have large effects on
firms’ financing choices. Moreover, we provide analytical characterization of
1 For example, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) find that about 75% of all private equity is owned by
households for whom it constitutes at least half of their total net worth. Heaton and Lucas (2004) document
that in the Survey of Small Business Finances, the principal owner of a firm holds on average 81% of the firm’s
equity, and the median owner wholly owns the firm. Other empirical studies include Gentry and Hubbard (2004),
Berger and Udell (1998), Cole, Wolken, and Woodburn (1996), and Petersen and Rajan (1994).
2 Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that debt often dominates equity in settings with
asymmetric information because debt is less information-sensitive. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that
managers with low levels of ownership may exert less effort. Bitler, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2005)
provide evidence that agency considerations play a key role in explaining why entrepreneurs on average hold
large ownership shares.
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the capital budgeting/hurdle rate, capital structure tradeoff, and endogenous
exit decisions.
We consider a risk-averse entrepreneur with access to an illiquid nontrad-
able investment project. The project requires a lump-sum investment to start
up, and generates stochastic cash flows that bear both systematic and idiosyn-
cratic risks. Like a consumer, the entrepreneur makes intertemporal consump-
tion/saving decisions and allocates his liquid wealth between a riskless asset
and a diversified market portfolio (as in Merton 1971). Like a firm, the en-
trepreneur also makes investment/capital budgeting, financing, and exit
decisions.
If he chooses to take on the project, the entrepreneur sets up a firm with
limited liability (e.g., a limited liability company [LLC]; an S corporation),
which makes debt nonrecourse. Moreover, the LLC or S corporation allows
the entrepreneur to face single-layer taxation for his business income. In nor-
mal business times, the entrepreneur uses business income to service the firm’s
debt. If the firm’s revenue falls short of servicing its debt, the entrepreneur may
still find it optimal to use his personal savings to service the debt in order to
continue to the firm’s operation. However, when revenue becomes sufficiently
low, the entrepreneur defaults on the debt, which triggers inefficient liquida-
tion, as in classic tradeoff models of corporate finance. If the firm does suf-
ficiently well, he might choose to incur the transaction and other costs (such
as taxes), repay the debt in full, and realize the capital gains by selling the
firm to cash out. After exiting from his business (cash-out or default), the en-
trepreneur becomes a regular household and lives on only his financial wealth.3
Cash-out and default allow the entrepreneur to achieve diversification benefits.
These business exit decisions are essentially (nontradable) American-style op-
tions on the illiquid project and take the form of endogenous double-threshold
policies.
Importantly, the entrepreneur’s business income and wealth accumulation
are endogenously affected by the firm’s capital budgeting, leverage, and busi-
ness exit decisions. While he can hedge the systematic component of his busi-
ness risks using the market portfolio, he cannot diversify the idiosyncratic risk.
Therefore, the entrepreneur faces incomplete markets, and the idiosyncratic
risk exposure will affect his interdependent consumption, investment, financ-
ing, and business exit decisions. Such nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk makes
entrepreneurial finance distinct from the standard textbook treatment of corpo-
rate finance, and can sometimes overturn the predictions of standard finance
theory on firm valuation, financing choices, and agency problems.
While we use the entrepreneurial firm as the motivating example, our frame-
work also applies to public firms with concentrated managerial ownership.
3 This one-time entrepreneurship assumption does not affect the model’s key economic mechanism in any signif-
icant way.
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Corporations in many countries are run by controlling shareholders (e.g.,
founders or founders’ families/heirs) who have significant cash-flow equity
rights in the firms.4 The lack of investor protection in some countries (La Porta,
de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998) and (concentrated) ownership structure
(via dual-class shares, pyramid-ownership structures, and cross-ownership) en-
trench underdiversified controlling shareholders and managers, and hence make
our model of managerial (entrepreneurial) decision making empirically
relevant. Albuquerque and Wang (2008) provide a general-equilibrium
incomplete-markets asset pricing model with both controlling shareholders and
outside investors. Their focus is on equilibrium asset pricing, which is rather
different from the focus of this article.
The main results of the model are the following. First, on capital structure,
our framework provides a generalized dynamic tradeoff model, where in addi-
tion to the standard tradeoff between tax benefits of debt and costs of financial
distress/agency (as in Leland 1994), risky debt also provides diversification
benefits. This is because risky debt helps reduce the entrepreneur’s exposure to
idiosyncratic business risk by enabling risk sharing in the default states. Hence,
he rationally chooses more debt and hence higher leverage for the firm. The op-
tions of default and cash-out in our model have important feedback effects on
the capital structure and pricing of credit risk. Our analysis also suggests that
the natural measure of leverage for entrepreneurial firms is private leverage,
defined as the ratio of the public (market) value of debt to the private (subjec-
tive) value of firm. This private leverage captures the diversification benefits
of risky debt and highlights the tradeoff between inside equity and outside
debt.
The diversification benefits of debt are large. Even without any tax bene-
fit of debt, the entrepreneurial firm still issues a significant amount of debt.
The diversification benefits also lead to a seemingly counterintuitive predic-
tion: More risk-averse entrepreneurs prefer higher leverage. On the one hand,
higher leverage increases the risk of the entrepreneur’s equity stake within the
firm. On the other hand, higher leverage implies less equity exposure to the
entrepreneurial project, making the entrepreneur’s overall portfolio (including
both his private equity in the firm and his liquid financial wealth) less risky.
This overall portfolio composition effect dominates the high leverage effect
within the firm. The more risk-averse the entrepreneur, the stronger the need
to reduce his firm risk exposure, therefore the higher the leverage.
Second, due to market incompleteness, the entrepreneur will demand an
idiosyncratic risk premium when valuing the firm. We derive an analytical
formula for this idiosyncratic risk premium, the key determinants of which
4 See La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) for an early cross-country study; Claessens, Djankov, and
Lang (2000) for East Asian countries; and Faccio and Lang (2002) for western European countries.
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are risk aversion, idiosyncratic volatility, and the sensitivity of entrepreneurial
value of equity with respect to cash flow. Quantitatively, we show that
ignoring the idiosyncratic risk premium can lead to substantial upward bias
in firm valuation. One consequence of this bias is that the conventionally used
leverage, which does not account for idiosyncratic risk premium, substantially
underestimates the leverage of entrepreneurial firms. Survey evidence by
Graham and Harvey (2001) shows that smaller firms are less likely to use
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) than larger ones. Our theory suggests
that small firms are likely run by underdiversified owners/managers who may
demand an idiosyncratic risk premium.
Naturally, the idiosyncratic risk premium also affects investment decisions.
We extend the standard law-of-one-price–based capital budgeting approach
(net present value [NPV] and adjusted present value [APV] analysis) to ac-
count for nondiversifiable risk and incomplete markets. We show that market
incompleteness leads to underinvestment for entrepreneurial firms relative to
otherwise identical public firms, especially for projects with high idiosyncratic
risk. Risky debt can partially alleviate the underinvestment problem by im-
proving diversification.
Third, unlike for the public firm where equityholders have risk-seeking in-
centives when risky debt is in place (Jensen and Meckling 1976), the en-
trepreneur may prefer to invest in projects with low idiosyncratic volatility
due to his precautionary motive, provided that the firm is not in deep financial
distress. This result holds even for very low risk aversion. Our model thus pro-
vides a potential explanation for the lack of empirical and survey evidence on
asset substitution and risk-shifting incentives.
Fourth, on option valuation, our model extends the Black-Scholes-Merton
option pricing methodology to account for the impact of idiosyncratic risk
under incomplete markets on (nontradable) option valuation. The standard
dynamic replicating portfolio argument no longer applies, and options can
be valued using only utility-based certainty equivalent methodology as we do
here. Idiosyncratic volatility now has two opposing effects for option valua-
tion. In addition to the standard positive convexity effect, as in Black-Scholes-
Merton, the entrepreneur’s precautionary saving motive under incomplete
markets implies a negative relation between option value and idiosyncratic
volatility, ceteris paribus.
The nondiversifiable risk and concentrated wealth in the business make the
entrepreneur value his equity less than do diversified investors. Thus, com-
pared with a firm owned by well-diversified investors, the entrepreneur de-
faults earlier on the firm’s debt and cashes out earlier on his business. Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) make the observation that equity is
a call option on firm assets, and hence is convex in the firm’s cash flows
(under complete markets). In our model, inside equity, while also a call op-
tion on the entrepreneurial firm’s asset, is not necessarily globally convex
in the underlying cash flows. When the entrepreneur’s risk aversion and/or
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idiosyncratic volatility are sufficiently high, the entrepreneur’s precautionary
saving demand can make his private value of equity concave in cash flows.
Our model generates a rich set of empirical predictions. Consider two oth-
erwise identical firms, one public and one private.5 First, the private firm will
have higher leverage due to diversification arguments. Second, while the stan-
dard tradeoff model (e.g., Leland 1994) predicts that leverage decreases with
volatility for the public firm, leverage for the private firm might increase with
idiosyncratic volatility due to the diversification benefits for entrepreneurs.
Third, while the complete-market option pricing analysis suggests that higher
idiosyncratic volatility defers the exercise of real options in public firms, our
model predicts that more idiosyncratic risk makes the private firm have higher
default thresholds and lower cash-out thresholds, hence implying a shorter du-
ration to be private. Finally, our model predicts that even with the same amount
of debt, the private firm will have more default risk and thus a higher credit
spread.
In a related study, Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi (2009) model the decision
of entrepreneurs to go public as the tradeoff between diversification benefits
and the costs of losing private control. While their paper studies an all-equity
private firm’s decision to go public, we analyze the entrepreneur’s decisions
on investment, debt/equity financing, consumption-saving, and business exit
(cash-out and default). Another related paper is by Herranz, Krasa, and Villamil
(2009), who analyze the impact of idiosyncratic risk on consumption, capital
structure, and default, among other issues. They also find that more risk-averse
owners default more.
Our article contributes to the dynamic capital structure literature6 and the
real options literature7 by highlighting the role of incomplete markets in en-
trepreneurs’ financing and investment decisions. UnlikeMiao andWang (2007),
who analyze a real options model under incomplete markets and all equity
financing, we integrate an incomplete-markets real options model with dy-
namic corporate finance. Our model also contributes to the incomplete-markets
consumption smoothing/precautionary saving literature by extending the pre-
cautionary saving problem based on constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
utility (see Merton 1971; Caballero 1991; Kimball and Mankiw 1989; Wang
2003, 2006) to allow the entrepreneur to reduce his idiosyncratic risk exposure
via financing and exit (i.e., cash-out and default) strategies.
5 The usual heterogeneity and endogeneity argument/critique applies. In reality, the ownership structure is obvi-
ously endogenous.
6 See Black and Cox (1976); Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989); and recent developments of Goldstein, Ju, and
Leland (2001); Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006); and Chen (2010).
7 See Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald and Siegel (1986) for seminal contributions on real options.
See Abel and Eberly (1994) for a unified analysis of investment under uncertainty. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
for a textbook treatment on the real options approach to investment.
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1. Model Setup
1.1 Investment Opportunities
An infinitely lived risk-averse entrepreneur has a take-it-or-leave-it project
at time 0, which requires a one-time investment I .8 The project generates a
stochastic revenue process {yt : t ≥ 0} that follows a geometric Brownian
motion (GBM):
dyt = μytdt + ωytdBt + ²ytd Zt , y0 given, (1)
where μ is the expected growth rate of revenue, and Bt and Zt are independent
standard Brownian motions that provide the sources of market (systematic) and
idiosyncratic risks of the private business, respectively. The parameters ω and
² are the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of revenue growth. The total
volatility of revenue growth is
σ =
√
ω2 + ²2. (2)
As we will show, the three volatility parameters ω, ², and σ have different
effects on the entrepreneur’s decision making.
In addition, the entrepreneur has access to standard financial investment
opportunities (Merton 1971).9 The entrepreneur allocates his liquid financial
wealth between a risk-free asset that pays a constant rate of interest r and a
diversified market portfolio with return Rt satisfying
dRt = μpdt + σpdBt , (3)
where μp and σp are the expected return and volatility of the risky asset, re-
spectively, and Bt is the standard Brownian motion introduced in Equation (1).
Let
η = μp − r
σp
(4)
denote the Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio, and let {xt : t ≥ 0} denote
the entrepreneur’s liquid (financial) wealth process. The entrepreneur invests
the amount φt in the market portfolio and the remaining amount xt − φt in the
risk-free asset.
1.2 Entrepreneurial Firm
If the entrepreneur decides to invest in the project, he runs it by setting up a
limited-liability entity, such as an LLC or an S corporation. The LLC or S cor-
poration allows the entrepreneur to face single-layer taxation for his business
8 In the Internet Appendix (available on the authors’ websites), we also model the investment decision as a real
option.
9 It is straightforward to consider entering the labor market as an alternative to running an entrepreneurial business,
which provides an endogenous opportunity cost of taking on the entrepreneurial project. Such an extension does
not change the key economics of our article in any significant way.
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income and makes the debt nonrecourse. We may extend the model to allow for
personal guarantee of debt, which effectively makes debt recourse to varying
degrees. The entrepreneur finances the initial one-time lump-sum cost I via his
own funds (internal financing) and external financing. In the benchmark case,
we assume that the only source of external financing is debt.10 One interpreta-
tion of the external debt is bank loans. The entrepreneur uses the firm’s assets
as collateral to borrow, so that the debt is secured.
We assume that debt is issued at par and is interest-only (consol) for tractabil-
ity reasons. Let b denote the coupon payment of debt and F0 denote the par
value of debt. Debt is priced competitively by diversified lenders. We further
assume that debt is issued at only time 0 and remains unchanged until the en-
trepreneur exits. Allowing for dynamic capital structure before exit will not
change the key economic tradeoff that we focus on: the impact of idiosyncratic
risk on entrepreneurial financing decisions.
After debt is in place, at any time t > 0, the entrepreneur has three choices:
(1) continuing his business; (2) defaulting on the outstanding debt, which leads
to the liquidation of his firm; (3) cashing out by selling the firm to a diversified
buyer.
While running the business, the entrepreneur receives income from the firm
in the form of cash payments (operating profit net of coupon payments). Neg-
ative cash payments are interpreted as cash injections by the entrepreneur into
the firm. Notice that trading riskless bonds and the diversified market portfo-
lio alone cannot help the entrepreneur diversify the idiosyncratic business risk.
He can sell the firm and cash out, which incurs a fixed transaction cost K .
The default timing Td and cash-out timing Tu are not contractible at time 0.
Instead, the entrepreneur chooses the default/cash-out policy to maximize his
own utility after he chooses the time-0 debt level. Thus, there is an inevitable
conflict of interest between financiers and the entrepreneur. The choices of
default and cash-out resemble American-style put and call options on the un-
derlying nontradable entrepreneurial firm. Since markets are incomplete for
the entrepreneur, we cannot price the entrepreneur’s options using the standard
dynamic replication argument (Black-Scholes-Merton).
At bankruptcy, the outside lenders take control and liquidate/sell the firm.
Bankruptcy ex post is costly, as in standard tradeoff models of capital structure.
We assume that the liquidation/sale value of the firm is equal to a fraction α
of the value of an all-equity (unlevered) public firm, A (y). The remaining
fraction (1− α) is lost due to bankruptcy costs. We also assume that absolute
priority is enforced, and abstract away from any ex post renegotiation between
the lenders and the entrepreneur.
10 See Petersen and Rajan (1994), Heaton and Lucas (2004), and Brav (2009) for evidence that debt is the primary
source of financing for most entrepreneurial firms. In Section 6, we introduce external equity as an additional
source of financing.
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Before the entrepreneur can sell the firm, he needs to retire the firm’s debt
obligation at par F0. Wemake the standard assumption that the buyer is well di-
versified. He will optimally relever the firm, as in the complete-markets model
of Leland (1994). The value of the firm after sale is the value of an optimally
levered public firm, V ∗(y).
After the entrepreneur exits his business (through default or cash-out), he
“retires” and lives on his financial income. He then faces a standard complete-
markets consumption and portfolio choice problem.
1.2.1 Taxes. We consider a simple tax environment. The entrepreneurial firm
pays taxes on its business profits at rate τe. When τe > 0, issuing debt has the
benefit of shielding part of the entrepreneur’s business profits from taxes. For
a public firm, the effective marginal tax rate is τm . Unlike the entrepreneurial
firm, the public firm is subject to double taxation (at the corporate and individ-
ual levels), and τm captures the net tax rate (following Miller 1977). Finally,
τg denotes the tax rate on the capital gains upon sale. Naturally, higher capital
gains taxes will delay the timing of cash-out.
1.2.2 Entrepreneur’s Objective. The entrepreneur derives utility from con-
sumption {ct : t ≥ 0} according to the following time-additive utility function:
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−δt u (ct ) dt
]
, (5)
where δ > 0 is the entrepreneur’s subjective discount rate and u( ∙ ) is an in-
creasing and concave function. The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize
his lifetime utility by optimally choosing consumption (ct ), financial portfolio
(φt ), and whether to start his business. If he starts his business, he also chooses
the financing structure of the firm (coupon b), and the subsequent timing deci-
sions of default and cash-out (Td , Tu).
2. Model Solution
In Section 2.1, we report the complete-markets solution for firm value and fi-
nancing decisions when the firm is owned by diversified investors. Then, we
analyze the entrepreneur’s consumption/saving, portfolio choice, default, and
initial investment and financing decisions. The complete-markets solution of
Section 2.1 serves as a natural benchmark for us to analyze the impact of non-
diversifiable idiosyncratic risk on entrepreneurial investment, financing, and
valuation.
2.1 Complete-markets Firm Valuation and Financing Policy
Consider a public firm owned by diversified investors. Because equityholders
internalize the benefits and costs of debt issuance, they will choose the firm’s
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debt policy to maximize ex ante firm value by trading off the tax benefits of
debt against bankruptcy and agency costs. The results in this case are well-
known.11 In Appendix A, we provide the after-tax value of an unlevered public
firm A(y) in Equation (A19), and the after-tax value of a public levered firm
V ∗(y) in Equation (A21).
Next, we turn to analyzing the entrepreneur’s decision problem under in-
complete markets.
2.2 Entrepreneur’s Problem
The significant lack of diversification invalidates the standard finance textbook
valuation analysis for firms owned by diversified investors. As a result, the
standard two-step complete-markets (Arrow-Debreu) analysis12 (first value
maximization and then optimal consumption allocation) no longer applies.
This nonseparability between value maximization and consumption smoothing
has important implications for real economic activities (e.g., investment and fi-
nancing) and the valuation of entrepreneurial firm–related financial claims.
We solve the entrepreneur’s problem by backward induction. First, we sum-
marize the entrepreneur’s consumption/saving and portfolio choice problem
after he retires from his business via either cashing out or defaulting on debt.
This “retirement-stage” optimization problem is the same as in Merton (1971),
a dynamic complete-markets consumption/portfolio choice problem. Second,
we solve the entrepreneur’s joint consumption/saving, portfolio choice, and
default decisions when the entrepreneur runs his private business. Third, we
determine the entrepreneur’s exit decisions (cash-out and default boundaries)
by comparing his value functions just before and after retirement. Finally, we
solve the entrepreneur’s initial (time-0) investment and financing decisions tak-
ing his future decisions into account.
Conceptually, our model setup applies to any utility function u(c) under
technical regularity conditions. For analytical tractability, we adopt the CARA
utility throughout the remainder of the article.13 That is, let u (c) = −e−γ c/γ,
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, which also mea-
sures precautionary motive. We emphasize that the main results and insights
of our article (the effect of nondiversifiable idiosyncratic shocks on investment
timing) do not rely on the choice of this utility function. As we show below,
the driving force of our results is the precautionary savings effect, which is
captured by utility functions with convex marginal utility such as CARA (see
11 For example, see Leland (1994); Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001); and Miao (2005).
12 Cox and Huang (1989) apply this insight to separate intertemporal portfolio choices from consumption in
continuous-time diffusion settings.
13 The CARA utility specification proves tractable in incomplete-markets consumption-saving problems with labor
income. Kimball and Mankiw (1989), Caballero (1991), Svensson and Werner (1993), and Wang (2006) have
all adopted this utility specification in various precautionary saving models. Miao and Wang (2007) use this
utility specification to analyze a real options exercising problem when the decision maker faces uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk from his investment opportunity.
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Leland 1968; Kimball 1990). While CARA utility does not capture wealth ef-
fects, it helps reduce the dimension of our double-barrier free-boundary prob-
lem, which makes the problem much more tractable compared with constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility.
2.2.1 Consumption/saving and Portfolio Choice after Exit. After exiting
from his business (via either default or cash-out), the entrepreneur no longer
has any business income, and lives on his financial wealth. The entrepreneur’s
optimization problem becomes the standard complete-market consumption and
portfolio choice problem (e.g., Merton 1971).
The entrepreneur’s wealth follows
dxt = (r (xt − φt )− ct ) dt + φt
(
μpdt + σpdBt
)
. (6)
The consumption and portfolio rules14 are given by
c(x)= r
(
x + η
2
2γ r2
+ δ − r
γ r2
)
, (7)
φ(x)= η
γ rσp
. (8)
2.2.2 Entrepreneur’s Decision Making While Running the Firm. Before
exit, the entrepreneur’s financial wealth evolves as follows:
dxt = (r (xt − φt )+ (1− τe) (y − b)− ct ) dt
+ φt
(
μpdt + σpdBt
)
, 0 < t < min (Td , Tu) . (9)
The principle of optimality implies that the entrepreneur’s value function
J s (x, y) satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
δ J s(x, y)=max
c,φ
u(c)+ (r x + φ (μp − r)+ (1− τe) (y − b)− c) J sx (x, y)
+μy J sy (x, y)+
(
σpφ
)2
2
J sxx (x, y)+
σ 2y2
2
J syy(x, y)
+ φσpωy J sxy(x, y) . (10)
14 An undesirable feature of CARA utility models is that consumption and wealth could potentially turn negative.
Cox and Huang (1989) provide analytical formulas for consumption under complete markets for CARA utility
with nonnegativity constraints. Intuitively, requiring consumption to be positive increases the entrepreneur’s
demand for precautionary savings (to avoid hitting the constraints in the future), which will likely strengthen our
results (such as diversification benefits of outside risky debt).
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The first-order conditions for consumption c and portfolio allocation φ are
as follows:
u′ (c) = J sx (x, y) , (11)
φ = −J
s
x (x, y)
J sxx (x, y)
(
μp − r
σ 2p
)
+ −J
s
xy (x, y)
J sxx (x, y)
ωy
σp
. (12)
We summarize the solution for consumption/saving, portfolio choice, de-
fault trigger yd , and cash-out trigger yu in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The entrepreneur exits his business when the revenue process
{yt : t ≥ 0} reaches either the default threshold yd or the cash-out threshold
yu , whichever comes first. Prior to exit, for given liquid wealth x and revenue
y, he chooses his consumption and portfolio rules as follows:
c (x, y)= r
(
x + G (y)+ η
2
2γ r2
+ δ − r
γ r2
)
, (13)
φ (x, y)= η
γ rσp
− ω
σp
yG ′ (y) , (14)
where G(∙) solves the ordinary differential equation:
rG(y) = (1− τe) (y − b)+(μ−ωη)yG ′(y)+ σ
2y2
2
G ′′(y)− γ r²
2y2
2
G ′(y)2,
(15)
subject to the following (free) boundary conditions at yd and yu :
G(yd) = 0, (16)
G ′(yd) = 0, (17)
G(yu) = V ∗ (yu)− F0 − K − τg
(
V ∗ (yu)− K − I
)
, (18)
G ′(yu) = (1− τg)V ∗′ (yu) . (19)
The complete-markets firm value V ∗(y) is defined in Equation (A21), and the
value of external debt F0 = F(y0) is given in Equation (C6).
Equation (13) states that consumption is equal to the annuity value of the
sum of financial wealth x , certainty equivalent wealth G(y), which is the
risk-adjusted subjective value of the private business, and two constant terms
capturing the effects of the expected excess returns and the wedge δ − r on
consumption. Equation (14) gives the entrepreneur’s portfolio holding, where
the first term is the standard mean-variance term, as in Merton (1971), and the
second term gives the entrepreneur’s hedging demand as he uses the market
portfolio to dynamically hedge the entrepreneurial business risk.
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The differential Equation (15) provides a valuation equation for the certainty
equivalent wealth G(y) from the entrepreneur’s perspective. In the CAPM,
only systematic risk demands a risk premium. Since the systematic volatility
of revenue growth is ω, the risk-adjusted expected growth rate of revenue in
the CAPM is
ν = μ− ωη. (20)
If we drop the last nonlinear term in Equation (15), the differential equation be-
comes the standard pricing equation: equating the instantaneous expected re-
turn of an asset under the risk-neutral measure (right-hand side) to the risk-free
rate (left-hand side). The last term in Equation (15) captures the additional dis-
count due to nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk. Intuitively, the higher the risk-
aversion parameter γ or the idiosyncratic volatility of revenue ²y, the larger
the discount on G(y) due to idiosyncratic risk. The next section provides more
detailed analysis on the impact of idiosyncratic risk on G(y).
Equation (16) comes from the value-matching condition for the entrepre-
neur’s default decision. It states that the private value of equity G(y) upon
default is equal to zero. Equation (17), often referred to as the smooth-pasting
condition, is the optimality condition for the entrepreneur in choosing default.
Now we turn to the cash-out boundary. Because the entrepreneur pays the
fixed cost K and triggers capital gains when cashing out, he naturally has in-
centive to wait before cashing out. However, waiting also reduces his diver-
sification benefits, ceteris paribus. The entrepreneur optimally trades off tax
implications, diversification benefits, and transaction costs when choosing the
timing of cashing out. The value-matching condition in Equation (18) states
that the private value of equity upon cashing out is equal to the after-tax value
of the public firm value after the entrepreneur pays the fixed cost K , retires
outstanding debt at par F0, and pays capital gains taxes. The smooth-pasting
condition in Equation (19) ensures that the entrepreneur optimally chooses his
cash-out timing.
2.2.3 Initial Financing and Investment Decisions. Next, we complete the
model solution by endogenizing the entrepreneur’s initial investment and fi-
nancing decision. The entrepreneurial firm has two financial claimants: inside
equity (entrepreneur) and outside creditors. The entrepreneur values his own-
ership at a certainty equivalent value G(y). Diversified lenders price debt in
competitive capital markets at F(y), which does not contain the idiosyncratic
risk premium because outside investors are fully diversified. Thus, the total
private value of the entrepreneurial firm is
S(y) = G(y)+ F(y). (21)
We may interpret S(y) as the total value that one needs to pay to acquire the
entrepreneurial firm by buying out the entrepreneur and the debtholders.
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We show that, at time 0, the optimal coupon b maximizes the private value
of the firm:
b∗ = argmax
b
S (y0; b) . (22)
This result arises from the entrepreneur’s utility maximization problem stated
in Equation (B11). Note the conflicts of interest between the entrepreneur and
external financiers. After debt is in place, the entrepreneur will no longer max-
imize the total value of the firm S(y), but his private value of equity G(y).
Theorem 1 captures this conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and out-
side creditors.
The last step is to determine whether the entrepreneur wants to undertake
the project. He makes the investment and starts up the firm at time 0 if his
lifetime utility with the project is higher than that without the project. This is
equivalent to the condition S (y0) > I .
We may interpret our model’s implication on capital structure as a general-
ized tradeoff model of capital structure for the entrepreneurial firm, where the
entrepreneur trades off the benefits of outside debt financing (diversification
and potential tax implications) against the costs of debt financing (bankruptcy
and agency conflicts between the entrepreneur and outside lenders). The nat-
ural measure of leverage from the entrepreneur’s point of view is the ratio
between the public value of debt F(y) and the private value of firm S(y),
L(y) = F(y)
S(y)
. (23)
We label L(y) as private leverage to reflect the impact of idiosyncratic risk on
the leverage choice. The entrepreneur’s preferences (e.g., risk aversion) influ-
ence the firm’s capital structure. The standard argument that since shareholders
can diversify for themselves, diversification plays no role in the capital struc-
ture decisions of public firms, is no longer valid for entrepreneurial firms.
Our discussions have focused on the parameter regions where the entrepre-
neur first establishes his firm as a private business and finances its operation
via an optimal mix of outside debt and inside equity. For completeness, we
now point out two special cases. First, when the cost of cashing out is suffi-
ciently small, it can be optimal for the entrepreneur to sell the firm immediately
(yu = y0). The other special case is when asset recovery rate is sufficiently
high, or the entrepreneur is sufficiently risk averse, so that he raises as much
debt as possible and defaults immediately (yd = y0). In our analysis below, we
focus on parameter regions that rule out these cases of immediate exit.
3. Risky Debt, Endogenous Default, and Diversification
We now investigate a special case of the model that highlights the diversifica-
tion benefits of risky debt. For this purpose, we shut down the cash-out option
by setting the cash-out cost K to infinity, making the cash-out option worthless.
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We use the following (annualized) baseline parameter values: risk-free inter-
est rate r = 3%, expected growth rate of revenue μ = 4%, systematic volatil-
ity of growth rate ω = 10%, idiosyncratic volatility ε = 20%, market price of
risk η = 0.4, and asset recovery rate α = 0.6. We set the effective marginal
Miller tax rate τm to 11.29% as in Graham (2000) and Hackbarth, Hennessy,
and Leland (2007).15 In our baseline parametrization, we set τe = 0, which
reflects the fact that the entrepreneur can avoid taxes on his business income
completely by deducting various expenses. Shutting down the tax benefits also
allows us to highlight the diversification benefits of debt. Later, we consider
the case where τe = τm , which can be directly compared with the complete-
markets model. We set the entrepreneur’s rate of time preference δ = 3%, and
consider three values of the risk-aversion parameter γ ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Finally, we
set the initial level of revenue y0 = 1.
3.1 Private Value of Equity G( y) and Default Threshold
Figure 1 plots the private value of equity G(y) and its derivative G ′ (y) as
functions of y. The top and the bottom panels plot the results for τe = 0
and τe = τm , respectively. When τe = 0, the entrepreneur who is risk neu-
tral (γ → 0, which is effectively the same as having complete markets) is-
sues no debt, because there are neither tax benefits (τe = 0) nor diversifica-
tion benefits (γ → 0). Equity value is equal to the present discounted value
of future cash flows (the straight-dash line shown in the top-left panel). A
risk-averse entrepreneur has incentive to issue debt in order to diversify id-
iosyncratic risk. The entrepreneur defaults when y falls to yd , the point where
G (yd) = G ′ (yd) = 0. When τe = τm , the entrepreneurial firm issues debt
to take advantage of tax benefits in addition to diversification benefits. The
bottom two panels of Figure 1 plot this case.
The derivativeG ′(y)measures the sensitivity of private value of equity G(y)
with respect to revenue y. As expected, the private value of equity G(y) in-
creases with revenue y, i.e., G ′(y) > 0. Analogous to Black-Scholes-Merton’s
observation that firm equity is a call option on firm assets, the entrepreneur’s
private equity G(y) also has a call option feature. For example, in the bottom
panels of Figure 1 (τe = τm), when γ approaches 0 (complete-markets case),
equity value is convex in revenue y, reflecting its call option feature.
Unlike the standard Black-Scholes-Merton paradigm, neither the entrepre-
neurial equity nor the firm is tradable. When the risk-averse entrepreneur can-
not fully diversify his project’s idiosyncratic risk, the global convexity of G(y)
no longer holds, as shown in Figure 1 for cases where γ > 0. The entrepreneur
15 We may interpret τm as the effective Miller tax rate, which integrates the corporate income tax, individual’s
equity, and interest income tax. Using Miller’s formula for the effective tax rate, and setting the interest income
tax at 0.30, corporate income tax at 0.31, and the individual’s long-term equity (distribution) tax at 0.10, we
obtain an effective tax rate of 11.29%.
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Figure 1
Private value of equity G( y): debt financing only
The top and bottom panels plot G(y) and its first derivative G′(y) for τe = 0 and τe = τm , respectively. We
plot the results for two levels of risk aversion (γ = 1, 2) alongside the benchmark complete-market solution
(γ → 0).
now has precautionary saving demand to partially buffer against the project’s
nondiversifiable idiosyncratic shocks. This precautionary saving effect induces
concavity in G(y). When revenue y is large, the precautionary saving effect is
large due to high idiosyncratic volatility ²y, and the option (convexity) effect
is small because the default option is further out of the money. Therefore, the
precautionary saving effect dominates the option effect for sufficiently high y,
making G(y) concave in y. The opposite is true for low y, where the convexity
effect dominates.
The precautionary saving effect also causes a more risk-averse entrepreneur
to discount cash flows at a higher rate. For a given level of coupon b, the
entrepreneur values his inside equity lower (smaller G(y)), and thus is more
willing to default and walk away. Moreover, a more risk-averse entrepreneur
also has a stronger incentive to diversify idiosyncratic risk by selling a bigger
share of his firm, which implies a larger coupon b, a higher default threshold,
and a higher debt value, ceteris paribus. The two effects reinforce each other.
Figure 1 confirms that G(y) decreases and the default threshold yd increases
with risk aversion γ .
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Table 1
Capital structure of entrepreneurial firms: debt financing only
Public Private Private Private Credit 10-Yr default
Coupon debt equity firm leverage (%) spread (bp) probability (%)
b F0 G0 S0 L0 CS pd (10)
Panel A: τe = 0
γ → 0 0.00 0.00 33.33 33.33 0.0 0 0.0
γ = 1 0.31 8.28 14.39 22.68 36.5 72 0.4
γ = 2 0.68 14.66 5.89 20.55 71.3 166 12.1
Panel B: τe = τm
γ → 0 0.35 9.29 20.83 30.12 30.9 75 0.3
γ = 1 0.68 14.85 7.02 21.86 67.9 159 9.5
γ = 2 0.85 16.50 3.77 20.27 81.4 213 22.3
Panel C: τe = τm , yd = b
γ → 0 0.06 1.94 27.73 29.67 6.5 21 0.0
γ = 1 0.12 3.67 16.95 20.62 17.8 36 0.2
γ = 2 0.45 10.94 7.53 18.47 59.2 109 19.8
This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has access to only debt financing and no op-
tion to cash out. We consider two business income tax rates (τe = 0 or τe = τm (11.29%)) and three levels of risk
aversion. The case “γ → 0” corresponds to the complete-markets (Leland) model. The remaining parameters
are reported in Section 3. Panels A and B report results for the case of optimal default. Panel C reports results
for the case of liquidity-induced default. All the results are for initial revenue y0 = 1.
3.2 Capital Structure for Entrepreneurial Firms
First, we consider the special case where risky debt offers only diversifica-
tion benefits for the entrepreneur and has no tax benefits (τe = 0). Then, we
incorporate the tax benefits of debt into our analysis.
Panel A of Table 1 provides results for the entrepreneurial firm’s capital
structure when τe = 0. If the entrepreneur is very close to being risk neutral
(γ → 0), the model’s prediction is the same as the complete-market bench-
mark. In this case, the standard tradeoff theory of capital structure implies that
the entrepreneurial firm will be entirely financed by equity (since debt provides
no benefits). The risk-neutral entrepreneur values the firm at its market value
33.33.
For γ = 1, the entrepreneur issues debt F0 = 8.28 in market value with
coupon b = 0.31, and values his nontradable equity at G0 = 14.39, giving the
private value of the firm S0 = 22.68. The drop in S0 is substantial (from 33.33
to 22.68, or about 32%) when increasing γ from zero to one. This drop in S0 is
mainly due to the risk-averse entrepreneur’s discount of his nontradable equity
position for bearing nondiversifiable idiosyncratic business risks. The default
risk of debt contributes little to the reduction of S0 (the 10-year cumulative
default probability rises from 0 to 0.4% only).
In Section 2, we introduced the measure of leverage for entrepreneurial
firms: private leverage L0, given by the ratio of public debt value F0 to pri-
vate value of the firm S0. Private leverage L0 naturally arises from the en-
trepreneur’s maximization problem and captures the entrepreneur’s tradeoff
between private value of equity and public value of debt in choosing debt
coupon policy. For γ = 1, the private leverage ratio is 36.5%.
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With a larger risk-aversion coefficient γ = 2, the entrepreneur borrows more
(F0 = 14.66) with a higher coupon (b = 0.68). He values his remaining
nontradable equity at G0 = 5.89, and the implied private leverage ratio L0 =
71.3% is much higher than 36.5%, the value for γ = 1. The more risk-averse
entrepreneur takes on more leverage, because he has a stronger incentive to sell
more of the firm to achieve greater diversification benefits. With greater risk
aversion, default is more likely (the 10-year cumulative default probability is
12.1%), and the credit spread is higher (166 basis points over the risk-free
rate).
Next, we incorporate the effect of tax benefits for the entrepreneur into our
generalized tradeoff model of capital structure for entrepreneurial firms. For
comparison with the complete-markets benchmark, we set τe = τm = 11.29%.
Therefore, the only difference between an entrepreneurial firm and a public
firm is that the entrepreneur faces nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk.
The first row of Panel B of Table 1 gives the results for the complete-markets
benchmark. Facing positive corporate tax rates, the public firm wants to issue
debt, but is also concerned with bankruptcy costs. The optimal tradeoff for
the public firm is to issue debt at the competitive market value F0 = 9.29
with coupon b = 0.35. The implied initial leverage is 30.9%, and the 10-year
cumulative default probability is tiny (0.3%).
Similar to the case with τe = 0, an entrepreneur facing nondiversifiable
idiosyncratic risk wants to issue more risky debt to diversify these risks. The
second row of Panel B shows that the entrepreneur with γ = 1 borrows 14.85
(with coupon b = 0.68), higher than the level for the public firm. The private
leverage more than doubles to 67.9%. Not surprisingly, the entrepreneur faces
a higher default probability, and the credit spread of his debt is also higher.
With γ = 2, debt issuance increases to 16.50, and private leverage increases
to 81.4%.
In our model, the entrepreneur has “deep pockets.” He chooses the optimal
default strategy and might voluntarily inject cash into the firm to service its
debt. However, in practice the entrepreneur may be liquidity constrained and
have no external funds to cover the firm’s debt service even if it is in his interest
to do so. Assume that the entrepreneur is forced to default whenever the project
revenue cannot cover the coupon payment, or equivalently when the firm’s
debt service coverage ratio, the ratio between revenue and debt service, just
falls below one. We refer to such default as liquidity-induced default, where
the default threshold is yd = b.
In Panel C of Table 1, we present the results for the case with liquidity-
induced default. Compared with Panel B (with optimal default), the entrepre-
neur defaults earlier and has higher default risk for the same coupon. His
inability to finance debt service when the coverage ratio is below one lowers
the option value of default and reduces his debt capacity. Both private leverage
and private firm value are hence smaller. As in the previous setting, the opti-
mal coupon and leverage increase significantly with risk aversion in the case
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Table 2
Comparison of capital structures
10-Yr default Public Equity Firm Financial Credit
probability (%) debt value value leverage (%) spread (bp)
pd (10) F0 G0 S0 L0 CS
γ = 2 (b = 0.85, yd = 0.47) 22.3 16.50 3.77 20.27 81.4 213
γ = 2 (b = 0.85, yd = 0.85) 77.0 16.47 1.64 18.11 90.9 214
γ = 2 (b = 0.45, yd = 0.45) 19.8 10.94 7.53 18.47 59.2 109
Public (b = 0.85, yd = 0.47) 22.3 16.50 11.10 27.60 59.8 213
Public (b = 0.85, yd = 0.35) 9.8 17.71 11.56 29.26 60.5 178
Public (b = 0.35, yd = 0.14) 0.3 9.29 20.82 30.11 30.9 75
This table first compares a liquidity-constrained entrepreneur with a deep-pocket entrepreneur, and then com-
pares a private firm owned by a risk-averse entrepreneur with a public firm. There is no option to cash out. We
assume τe = τm , while the rest of the parameters are reported in Section 3. All the results are for initial revenue
y0 = 1.
of liquidity-induced default, which shows that our key results on the diversifi-
cation benefit of risky debt are robust to the different ways default is triggered.
3.3 Comparison of Capital Structure Decisions
To further demonstrate the important role of idiosyncratic risk and default de-
cisions in determining the capital structure of entrepreneurial firms, we make
two comparisons and discuss three experiments, as illustrated in Table 2.
First, we compare a liquidity-constrained entrepreneur with a deep-pocket
entrepreneur in Rows 1–3 of Table 2. Rows 1 and 3 are taken from Panels B
and C, respectively, of Table 1. Suppose the liquidity-constrained entrepreneur
faces the coupon rate b = 0.85, which is the optimal level for the deep-pocket
entrepreneur. The liquidity-constrained entrepreneur defaults at the threshold
yd = b = 0.85. Compared with Row 1, this early default lowers equity value
from 3.77 to 1.64 and raises the 10-year default probability from 22.3% to
77%. But it lowers debt value very little because the recovery value of debt
is significantly higher. Anticipating higher default probability, the liquidity-
constrained entrepreneur will issue less debt by reducing the coupon rate from
0.85 to 0.45 (see Row 3). Comparing liquidity-induced default and optimal
default (with endogenously chosen coupon), we see that liquidity constraint
lowers private equity value, firm value, and leverage (compare Rows 1 and 3).
Next, we compare a deep-pocket entrepreneur with a public firm. First, we
consider an econometrician who has correctly identified the entrepreneurial
firm’s debt coupon b = 0.85 and default threshold yd = 0.47, but does not
realize that the entrepreneur’s subjective valuation G(y; b, yd) is lower than
the corresponding public equity value E(y; b, yd) due to nondiversifiable id-
iosyncratic risk. As Row 4 of Table 2 shows, the econometrician assigns the
entrepreneur’s equity with a value at E0 = 11.10 instead of the subjective
valuation G0 = 3.77, thus obtaining a leverage ratio of 59.8%, substantially
lower than the entrepreneur’s private leverage L0 = 81.4%. The large differ-
ence between the private and market leverage ratios highlights the economic
significance of taking idiosyncratic risk into account. Simply put, standard
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corporate finance methodology potentially underestimates the leverage of
entrepreneurial firms.
Second, we highlight the effect of different default decisions for a deep-
pocket entrepreneur and a public firm. The public and the entrepreneurial firms
have significantly different leverage decisions because both debt issuance and
default decisions on debt (given the same level of debt coupon outstanding)
are different. To see the quantitative effects of endogenous default decisions
on leverage, we hold the coupon rate on outstanding debt fixed. That is, con-
sider a public firm that has the same technology/environment parameters as
the entrepreneurial firm. Moreover, the two firms have the same debt coupons
(b = 0.85).
As Row 5 shows, facing the same coupon b = 0.85, the public firm defaults
when revenue reaches the default threshold yd = 0.35, which is lower than
the threshold yd = 0.47 for the entrepreneurial firm. Intuitively, facing the
same coupon b, the entrepreneurial firm defaults earlier than the public firm
because of the entrepreneur’s aversion to nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk.
The implied shorter distance-to-default for the entrepreneurial firm translates
into a higher 10-year default probability (22.3% for the entrepreneurial firm
versus 9.8% for the public firm) and a higher credit spread (213 basis points for
the entrepreneurial firm versus 178 basis points for the public firm). Defaulting
optimally for the public firm raises its value from S0 = 27.60 to S0 = 29.26.
When the public firm chooses optimal debt, it raises firm value further to S0 =
30.11. In addition, it issues less debt (with a smaller coupon) than the deep-
pocket entrepreneur, as reported in the last row of Table 2. As a result, the
public firm has a lower leverage ratio than the entrepreneurial firm.
The last two comparisons help explain the differences in leverage ratios
between the entrepreneurial firm and the public firm. First, fixing both the
coupon and the default threshold, the entrepreneur’s subjective valuation (due
to nondiversifiable risks) has significant impact on the implied leverage ra-
tio. Ignoring subjective valuation can lead one to substantially underestimate
the entrepreneurial firm’s leverage. Second, facing the same coupon, the en-
trepreneurial firm defaults earlier than the public firm, which reduces the value
of debt and lowers the leverage ratio. Third, diversification motives make the
entrepreneur issue more debt than the public firm, which further raises the
leverage ratio of the entrepreneurial firm. While the numerical results are pa-
rameter specific, the analysis provides support for our intuition that the en-
trepreneur’s need for diversification and the subjective valuation discount for
bearing nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk are key determinants of the private
leverage for an entrepreneurial firm.
4. Cash-out Option as an Alternative Channel of Diversification
We now turn to a richer and more realistic setting where the entrepreneur can
diversify idiosyncratic risk through both the default and cash-out options. The
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Figure 2
Private value of equity G( y): debt financing and cash-out option
The left panel plots the private value of equity G(y) as a function of revenue y, and the right panel plots its first
derivative.
entrepreneur avoids the downside risk by defaulting if the firm’s stochastic
revenue falls to a sufficiently low level. When the firm does well enough, the
entrepreneur may want to capitalize on the upside by selling the firm to diver-
sified investors.
In addition to the baseline parameter values from Section 3, we set the ef-
fective capital gains tax rate from selling the business τg = 10%, reflecting
the tax deferral advantage.16 We set the initial investment cost for the project
I = 10, which is 1/3 of the market value of project cash flows. We choose the
cash-out cost K = 27 to generate a 10-year cash-out probability of about 20%
(with γ = 2), consistent with the success rates of venture capital firms (Hall
and Woodward 2010).
4.1 Cash-out Option: Crowding Out Debt
Figure 2 plots the private value of equity G(y) and its first derivative G ′(y)
for an entrepreneur with risk aversion γ = 1 when he has the option to cash
out. The function G (y) smoothly touches the horizontal axis on the left and
the dashed line denoting the value of cashing out on the right. The two tangent
points give the default and cash-out thresholds, respectively. For sufficiently
low values of revenue y, the private value of equity G(y) is increasing and
convex because the default option is deep in the money. For sufficiently high
values of y, G(y) is also increasing and convex because the cash-out option is
deep in the money. For revenue y in the intermediate range, neither default nor
cash-out option is deep in the money, and the precautionary saving motive may
be large enough to induce concavity. As shown in the right panel of Figure 2,
16 In Appendix D.1, we investigate the effects of different capital gains taxes.
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Table 3
Capital structure of entrepreneurial firms: debt financing and cash-out option
Public Private Private Private 10-Yr default 10-Yr cash-out
Coupon debt equity firm leverage (%) prob (%) prob (%)
b F0 G0 S0 L0 pd (10) pu (10)
Panel A: τe = 0
γ → 0 0.00 0.00 33.33 33.33 0.0 0.0 0.0
γ = 1 0.12 3.61 19.36 22.97 15.7 0.0 9.2
γ = 2 0.43 10.36 10.01 20.36 50.9 2.2 20.4
Panel B: τe = τm
γ → 0 0.35 9.29 20.83 30.12 30.9 0.3 0.0
γ = 1 0.55 12.45 9.57 22.02 56.5 4.2 12.3
γ = 2 0.66 13.68 6.24 19.92 68.7 10.1 23.3
This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has access to both public debt financing
and cash-out option to exit from his project. We report results for two business income tax rates (τe = 0 or
τe = τm (11.29%)). The rest of the parameters are reported in Section 4. All the results are for initial revenue
y0 = 1.
G ′ (y) first increases for low values of y, then decreases for intermediate values
of y, and finally increases again for high values of y.
Table 3 provides the capital structure information of an entrepreneurial firm
with both cash-out and default options. Again we consider the two cases τe = 0
and τe = τm .
When markets are complete, with τe = 0, there is no reason for the firm to
issue debt or go public. Thus, the optimal leverage and the cash-out probability
will both be zero. When τe is positive, the firm’s cash-out option is essentially
an option to adjust the firm’s capital structure (recall that there is no diversi-
fication benefit for public firms). In this case, given our calibrated fixed cost
K , the 10-year cash-out probability is essentially zero, and hence this option
value is close to zero for the public firm. Therefore, we expect that the bulk of
the cash-out option value for entrepreneurial firms will come from the diversi-
fication benefits, not from the option to readjust leverage.
For a risk-averse entrepreneur, the prospect of cashing out lowers the firm’s
incentive to issue debt. When τe = 0 and γ = 1, debt coupon falls from b =
0.31 for the firm with only the default option to 0.12 when the cash-out option
is added, and the private leverage ratio at issuance falls from L0 = 36.5%
to 15.7%. The 10-year default probability is close to zero, but the 10-year
cash-out probability is 9.2%, which is economically significant. For more risk-
averse entrepreneurs (e.g., γ = 2), the private leverage ratio is 50.9%, smaller
than 71.3% for the setting without the cash-out option. While a higher tax rate
τe does increase the amount of debt the firm issues, the impact of the cash-out
option is qualitatively similar to the no-tax case. Thus, given the opportunity
to sell his business to public investors, the entrepreneur substitutes away from
risky debt and relies more on the future potential of cashing out to diversify his
idiosyncratic risk.
Our analysis is under the assumption that debt is priced in the public market.
We have also computed the private value of debt if the lenders are
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Figure 3
Comparative statics—optimal coupon and private leverage with respect to idiosyncratic volatilities ²: the
case of debt and cash-out option
The two panels plot the optimal coupon b and the corresponding optimal private leverage L0 at y0 = 1. In each
case, we plot the results for two levels of risk aversion (γ = 0.5, 1) alongside the benchmark complete-market
solution (γ → 0).
underdiversified and/or if debt is actually held by the entrepreneur.17 While
nondiversifiable risk does lower the debt value from the perspective of under-
diversified investors, the difference from the value of public debt is small. This
suggests that even when lenders are underdiversified, issuing risky debt still
provides significant diversification benefits for the entrepreneur. Intuitively,
this is because in normal times lenders have significantly less exposure to firm-
specific risks compared with the entrepreneur.
4.2 Idiosyncratic Risk, Leverage, and Risk Premium
We now turn to the impact of idiosyncratic volatility on leverage and the risk
premium for equity. Figure 3 shows its effect on leverage. In complete-markets
models, an increase in (idiosyncratic) volatility ² raises default risk, hence the
market leverage ratio and the coupon rate for the public firm decrease with id-
iosyncratic volatility. By contrast, risk-averse entrepreneurs take on more debt
to diversify their idiosyncratic risk when ² is higher. For γ = 1, both coupon
and leverage become monotonically increasing in ². This result implies that
the private leverage ratio for entrepreneurial firms increases with idiosyncratic
volatility even for mild risk aversion.
For public firms, the risk premium for equity is determined by the firm’s sys-
tematic risk. For entrepreneurial firms, both systematic and idiosyncratic risks
matter for the risk premium. Without loss of generality, we decompose the en-
trepreneur’s risk premium into two components: the systematic risk
17 We thank the referee for recommending this exercise. The results are reported in the Internet Appendix.
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premium π s(y) and the idiosyncratic risk premium π i (y). Rearranging Equa-
tion (15) gives
π s(y)= ηωG
′ (y)
G (y)
y = ηωd lnG(y)
d ln y
, (24)
π i (y)= γ r
2
(
²yG ′(y)
)2
G (y)
. (25)
The systematic risk premium π s(y) defined in Equation (24) takes the same
form as in standard asset pricing models. It is the product of the (market)
Sharpe ratio η, the systematic volatility ω, and the elasticity of G(y) with re-
spect to y, where the elasticity captures the impact of optionality on the risk
premium.18
Unlike π s(y), the idiosyncratic risk premium π i (y) defined in Equation (25)
directly depends on risk aversion γ and
(
²yG ′(y)
)2
, the conditional (idiosyn-
cratic) variance of the entrepreneur’s equity G(y). The conditional (idiosyn-
cratic) variance term reflects the fact that the idiosyncratic risk premium π i (y)
is determined by the entrepreneur’s precautionary saving demand, which de-
pends on the conditional variance of idiosyncratic risk (Caballero 1991; Wang
2006).
We examine the behavior of these risk premiums in Figure 4. The entrepre-
neur’s equity is a levered position in the firm. When the firm approaches de-
fault, the systematic component of the risk premium π s(y) behaves similarly
to the standard valuation model. That is, the significant leverage effect around
the default boundary implies that the systematic risk premium diverges to in-
finity when y approaches yd . When the firm approaches the cash-out threshold,
the cash-out option makes the firm value more sensitive to cash flow shocks,
which also tends to raise the systematic risk premium.
The idiosyncratic risk premium π i (y) behaves quite differently. Figure 4 in-
dicates that the idiosyncratic risk premium is small when the firm is close to
default, and it increases with y for most values of y. The intuition is as fol-
lows. The numerator in Equation (25) reflects the entrepreneur’s precautionary
saving demand, which depends on the conditional idiosyncratic variance of the
changes in the certainty equivalent value of equity G(y) and risk aversion γ .
Both the conditional idiosyncratic variance and G(y) increase with y. When
y is large, the conditional idiosyncratic variance rises fast relative to G(y),
generating a large idiosyncratic risk premium.
18 Despite this standard interpretation for the systematic risk premium, it is worth pointing out that πs (y) also in-
directly reflects the nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk that the entrepreneur bears, and risk aversion γ indirectly
affects πs (y) through its impact on G (y).
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Figure 4
Systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium
This figure plots the systematic and idiosyncratic risk premium for entrepreneurial firms. The top panels plot the
results for two levels of risk aversion (γ = 2, 4). The bottom panels plot the results for two levels of idiosyncratic
volatility (² = 0.20, 0.25). We assume γ = 2 when changing ², and ² = 0.2 when changing γ .
5. Idiosyncratic Risk and Investment
So far, we have focused on the effects of idiosyncratic risk on financing deci-
sions. In this section, we explore how idiosyncratic risk influences an
entrepreneurial firm’s investment decisions.19 We analyze two aspects of
investment decisions. First, we examine the cutoff rule for taking on the in-
vestment at time t = 0, i.e., the breakeven investment cost I that makes the
entrepreneur indifferent between undertaking the project or not. The standard
NPV analysis no longer applies due to nondiversifiable risk and incomplete
markets. Second, we study the entrepreneur’s incentives for risk shifting when
choosing among projects with different degrees of idiosyncratic risk (after debt
is chosen).
5.1 Project Choice: Breakeven Investment Cost
As shown in Section 2, the entrepreneur will invest in a project at t = 0 only
if the total value of the entrepreneurial firm S(y0) is greater than the one-time
lump-sum cost I . In the full model where the entrepreneur has access to debt
19 We thank the referee for suggesting deepening our analysis on the impact of financing on investment decisions.
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Table 4
Idiosyncratic risk, risk aversion, and investment decisions
Optimal leverage No leverage
² = 0.15 ² = 0.20 ² = 0.25 ² = 0.15 ² = 0.20 ² = 0.25
γ → 0 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33 33.33
γ = 1.0 25.64 23.00 20.88 25.13 22.19 19.82
γ = 2.0 23.09 20.38 18.36 22.38 19.26 16.89
This table reports the breakeven investment cost I for different levels of entrepreneurial risk aversion γ and
idiosyncratic volatility ² in the case with debt financing and cash-out option (τe = 0).
financing and a cash-out option, the entrepreneur triggers capital gains taxes
(with the tax base being the firm’s investment cost I ) when he exercises his
cash-out option. Therefore, private firm value S(y0) depends on the investment
cost I via the potential capital gains tax. Technically, this makes finding the
breakeven investment cost I ∗ = S(y0|I ∗) a fixed-point problem.
We compute the breakeven cost I ∗ for the case with debt financing and cash-
out option for various values of risk aversion γ and idiosyncratic volatility ².
Two sets of results are reported in Table 4, one with optimal debt financ-
ing, the other under the assumption of no risky debt. We focus on the case
τe = 0, which better highlights the diversification benefit of debt. With com-
plete markets (γ → 0), the entrepreneur will neither issue debt nor cash out.
The breakeven investment cost is thus simply equal to the present value of the
perpetual revenue flow yt , which is independent of idiosyncratic volatility.
When markets are incomplete, either under optimal leverage or no lever-
age, the breakeven investment cost falls as the entrepreneur becomes more risk
averse and/or when the idiosyncratic volatility of the project becomes higher.
For example, under optimal leverage with ² = 0.15, those projects with invest-
ment costs between 25.64 and 33.33 will be rejected by an entrepreneur with
risk aversion γ = 1, but accepted by an otherwise identical yet fully diversified
manager. As γ or ² increases, the difference in the breakeven costs between
the entrepreneur and a diversified manager gets even bigger, leading to more
projects being turned down by the entrepreneur. Intuitively, higher risk aver-
sion and higher idiosyncratic volatility raise the idiosyncratic risk premium
that the entrepreneur demands for holding the firm and hence lower the cutoff
level for the investment cost I . Moreover, comparing the case under optimal
leverage and under no leverage, we see that the ability to issue risky debt raises
the breakeven investment costs, hence making the entrepreneur more willing
to invest. This effect is again stronger for higher risk aversion and higher id-
iosyncratic volatility.
To summarize, our results show that idiosyncratic risk and incomplete mar-
kets generate underinvestment for risk-averse entrepreneurs (relative to public
firms). The underinvestment problem is more severe for more risk-averse en-
trepreneurs or projects with higher idiosyncratic volatility. Importantly, risky
debt helps alleviate this underinvestment problem by improving diversification.
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5.2 Project Choice: Asset Substitution Versus Risk Sharing
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that there is an incentive problem asso-
ciated with risky debt: After debt is in place, managers have incentives to take
on riskier projects to take advantage of the option type of payoff structure of
equity. However, there is limited empirical evidence in support of such risk-
shifting behaviors.20 One possible explanation is that managerial risk aversion
can potentially dominate the risk-shifting incentives. Our model provides a
natural setting to investigate these two competing effects quantitatively.
We consider the following project choice problem. Suppose the risk-averse
entrepreneur can choose among a continuum of mutually exclusive projects
with different idiosyncratic volatilities ² in the interval [²min, ²max] after debt
is in place. Let F0 be the market value of existing debt with the coupon b.
The entrepreneur then chooses idiosyncratic volatility ²+ ∈ [²min, ²max] to
maximize his own utility. As shown in Section 2, the entrepreneur effectively
chooses ²+ to maximize his private value of equity G(y0), taking the debt
contract (b, F0) as given. Let this maximized value be G+(y0).
Ina rationalexpectationsequilibrium, the lendersanticipate theentrepreneur’s
ex post incentive of choosing the level of idiosyncratic volatility ²+ to maxi-
mize G(y0), and price the initial debt contract accordingly in competitive capi-
tal markets. Therefore, the entrepreneur ex antemaximizes the private value of
the firm, S(y0) = G+(y0)+F0, taking the competitive market debt pricing into
account. We solve this joint investment and financing (fixed-point) problem.
Figure 5 illustrates the solution of this optimization problem. We set ²min =
0.05 and ²max = 0.35. When γ → 0, the entrepreneur chooses the high-
est idiosyncratic volatility project with ²max = 0.35. The optimal coupon is
0.297. In this case, the entrepreneur effectively faces complete markets. The
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argument applies because the market value of eq-
uity is convex and the risk shifting problem arises. When the entrepreneur is
risk averse, he demands a premium for bearing the nondiversifiable idiosyn-
cratic risk, which tends to lower his private value of equity G (y0). When this
effect dominates, the entrepreneur prefers projects with lower idiosyncratic
volatility. For example, for γ = 1, the entrepreneur chooses the project with
²min = 0.05, with the corresponding optimal coupon 0.491. Even when the
degree of risk aversion is low (e.g., γ = 0.1, which implies an idiosyncratic
risk premium of 2 basis points for ² = 0.05, or 20 basis points for ² = 0.20),
we still find that the risk-aversion effect dominates the risk-shifting incentive.
From this numerical example, we find that in our model, even with low
risk aversion, the precautionary saving incentive tends to dominate the asset
substitution incentive in normal times (risk shifting will still be important when
the firm is sufficiently close to default, where the entrepreneur’s value function
becomes convex). Our argument applies to public firms as well, provided that
(i) managerial compensation is tied to firm performance; and (ii) managers
20 See Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Graham and Harvey (2001), among others.
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Figure 5
Private equity value as a function of idiosyncratic volatility after optimal debt is in place
This figure plots the private value of equity for different choices of idiosyncratic volatility ² after debt issuance.
The coupon is fixed at the optimal value corresponding to given risk aversion. We assume ²min = 0.05, ²max =
0.35. The remaining parameters are the same as in Table 3.
are not fully diversified, behave in their own interests, and are entrenched.
Thus, the lack of empirical evidence for asset substitution may be due to the
nondiversifiable idiosyncratic risk faced by risk-averse decision makers.
6. External Equity
While debt is the primary source of financing for most entrepreneurial (small-
business) firms, high-tech startups are often financed by venture capital (VC),
which often use external equity in various forms as the primary source of
financing. This financing choice particularly makes sense when the liquida-
tion value of firm’s assets is low (e.g., computer software firms). Hall and
Woodward (2008) provide a quantitative analysis for the lack of diversification
of entrepreneurial firms backed by venture capital. In this section, we extend
the baseline model of Section 1 by allowing the entrepreneur to issue external
equity at t = 0, and study the effect of external equity on the diversification
benefits of risky debt.
If it is costless to issue external equity, a risk-averse entrepreneur will want
to sell the entire firm to the VC right away. We motivate the costs of issuing
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external equity through the agency problems of Jensen and Meckling (1976).
Intuitively, the more concentrated the entrepreneur’s ownership, the better in-
centive alignment he achieves (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling
1976). Let ψ denote the fraction of equity that the entrepreneur retains and
hence 1 − ψ denote the fraction of external equity. Consider the expected
growth rate of revenue μ in Equation (1). We capture the incentive problem of
ownership in reduced form by making μ an increasing and concave function
of the entrepreneur’s ownership ψ (μ′(ψ) > 0 and μ′′(ψ) < 0). Intuitively,
the concavity relation suggests that the incremental value from incentive align-
ment becomes lower as ownership concentration rises, ceteris paribus.
More specifically, we model the growth rate μ as a quadratic function of
the entrepreneur’s ownership ψ , μ(ψ) = −0.02ψ2 + 0.04ψ + 0.03, with
ψ ∈ [0, 1]. This functional form implies that the maximum expected growth
rate is 5%, when the entrepreneur owns the entire firm (ψ = 1), while the
lowest growth rate is 3%, when the entire firm is sold (ψ = 0). For simplicity,
we rule out dynamic adjustments of ψ . Once ψ is chosen, the expected growth
rate μ will remain constant thereafter.
After external debt (with coupon b) and equity (with share 1−ψ of the firm
ownership) are issued at t = 0, the entrepreneur’s optimal policies, including
consumption/portfolio rule and default/cash-out policies, are summarized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The entrepreneur exits from his business when the revenue pro-
cess {yt : t ≥ 0} reaches either the default threshold yd or the cash-out thresh-
old yu , whichever occurs first. When the entrepreneur runs his firm, he chooses
his consumption and portfolio rules as follows:
c (x, y)= r
(
x + ψG (y)+ η
2
2γ r2
+ δ − r
γ r2
)
, (26)
φ (x, y)= η
γ rσp
− ψω
σp
yG ′ (y) , (27)
where G( ∙ ) solves the free boundary problem given by the differential
equation:
rG(y) = (1− τe) (y − b)+νyG ′(y)+ σ
2y2
2
G ′′(y)−ψγ r²
2y2
2
G ′(y)2, (28)
subject to the following (free) boundary conditions at yd and yu :
G(yd) = 0, (29)
G ′(yd) = 0, (30)
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ψG(yu) = ψV ∗ (yu)− F0 − K − τg
(
ψV ∗ (yu)− K − (I − (1− ψ) E0)
)
,
(31)
ψG ′(yu) = (1− τg)ψV ∗′ (yu) . (32)
The complete-markets firm value V ∗(y) is defined in Equation (A21), the value
of external debt F0 = F(y0) is given in Equation (C6), and the value of exter-
nal equity E0 = E(y0) is given in Equation (C10).
Equation (28) shows how the partial ownership ψ affects the entrepreneur’s
private value of equity. A more concentrated inside equity position (higher ψ)
raises the last nonlinear term, which raises the idiosyncratic risk premium that
the entrepreneur demands. The ownership ψ also affects the boundary condi-
tions at cash-out. The value-matching condition in Equation (31) at the cash-
out boundary states that, upon cashing out, the entrepreneur’s ownership is
worth a fraction ψ of the after-tax value of the public firm value net of (i) the
amount required to retire outstanding debt at par F0; (ii) fixed costs K ; and
(iii) capital gains taxes. The smooth-pasting condition in Equation (32) also
reflects the effects of partial ownership.
Finally, at time t = 0, the entrepreneur chooses debt coupon b and initial
ownership ψ to maximize the private value of the firm S(y), which now has
three parts: inside equity (entrepreneur’s ownership), diversified outside equity,
and outside debt:
S(y) = ψG(y)+ (1− ψ)E0(y)+ F(y). (33)
The results are reported in Table 5. If the entrepreneur is risk-neutral, he will
clearly prefer to keep 100% ownership. In this case, all the equity in the firm is
privately held, and the private leverage is 0 if τe = 0, or 33.6% when τe = τm .
When τe = 0, an entrepreneur with γ = 1 lowers his ownership to 67%, which
reduces the growth rate to 4.78% (about a 0.2% drop). However, the coupon
rises from 0 to 0.43, and private leverage rises from 0 to 34.6%. The 10-year
default and cash-out probabilities rise from 0 to 0.6% and 8.9%, respectively.
When γ = 2, the ownership drops further to 62%, while the coupon rises
to 0.52, and private leverage rises to 41.7%. The 10-year cash-out probability
also rises to 12.0%. In other words, a more risk-averse entrepreneur actively
uses all three channels (outside equity, outside debt, and cash-out option) to
diversify his idiosyncratic risk exposure.
The results are similar when τe = τm . When γ = 1, the coupon rises from
0.55 to 0.66, and private leverage rises from 33.6% to 48.8%. Such an increase
in demand for debt due to diversification is economically sizeable, especially
considering that the increase is partially offset by the reduced tax benefit of
debt due to lower expected growth rates. When γ = 2, the ownership drops
to 65%, while private leverage rises further to 51.2%. Notice that while the
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Table 5
Capital structure of entrepreneurial firms: external debt/equity and cash-out option
Public Public Private Private Private Default Cash-out
Ownership Coupon debt equity equity firm leverage (%) prob (%) prob (%)
ψ b F0 (1− ψ)E0 ψG0 S0 L0 pd (10) pu (10)
Panel A: τe = 0
γ → 0 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
γ = 1 0.67 0.43 11.49 10.22 11.52 33.22 34.6 0.6 8.9
γ = 2 0.62 0.52 13.06 10.87 7.42 31.35 41.7 2.2 12.0
Panel B: τe = τm
γ → 0 1.00 0.55 15.23 0.00 30.07 45.30 33.6 0.4 0.0
γ = 1 0.69 0.66 16.00 8.50 8.26 32.76 48.8 3.8 11.3
γ = 2 0.65 0.68 15.93 9.50 5.67 31.10 51.2 6.0 15.4
This table reports the results for the setting where the entrepreneur has access to public debt/equity financing
and cash-out option. We assume μ(ψ) = −0.02ψ2+0.04ψ+0.03, while the remaining parameters are reported
in Section 4. All the results are for initial revenue y0 = 1.
coupon rises from 0.66 to 0.68, the initial value of debt actually falls slightly.
This is because both the default and cash-out probability are higher for higher
γ , which reduces the expected life of the debt and offsets the effect of a higher
coupon on debt value.
The optimal ownership predicted by the model (between 60% and 70%) is
low compared with the data (81% on average, according to Heaton and Lucas
2004). One possible explanation is that the agency costs of external equity
we consider are small, and raising the agency costs will increase the degree
of ownership concentration as well as the amount of debt the entrepreneur
issues. The results in Table 5 thus confirm the robustness of our finding: En-
trepreneurial firms still have sizeable demand for risky debt and cash-out
options for diversification purpose even when external equity is available.
Our model is also applicable to publicly traded firms where managers have
significant wealth exposures due to their concentrated equity positions in firms.
It shows that the interaction between ownership structure and capital structure
is potentially quantitatively important. Our analysis implies that private lever-
age rather than public leverage is the relevant measure of capital structure for
public firms where managers are underdiversified and have significant discre-
tion. Using publicly available data to construct public leverage may potentially
misrepresent the managerial tradeoff between equity and debt. One conse-
quence is that credit rating agencies might underestimate the leverage and
default probability of these firms considerably, and hence might issue credit
ratings that are too high for such firms.
7. Concluding Remarks
Entrepreneurial investment opportunities are often illiquid and nontradable.
Entrepreneurs cannot completely diversify away project-specific risks for rea-
sons such as incentives and informational asymmetry. Therefore, the standard
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law-of-one-price–based valuation/capital structure paradigm in corporate fi-
nance cannot be directly applied to entrepreneurial finance. An entrepreneur
acts both as a producer making dynamic investment, financing, and exit deci-
sions for his business project, and as a household making consumption/saving
and portfolio decisions. The dual roles of the entrepreneur motivate us to de-
velop a dynamic incomplete-markets model of entrepreneurial finance that
centers around the nondiversification feature of the entrepreneurial business.
Besides studying the financing and investment decisions for entrepreneurs
and underdiversified managers, our modelling framework can also be used to
value the stock options of underdiversified executives or to analyze how these
executives make capital structure and investment decisions. See Carpenter,
Stanton, and Wallace (2010) for a recent study on the optimal exercise pol-
icy for an executive stock option and implications for firm costs.
We have taken a standard optimization framework where the entrepreneur’s
utility depends on only his consumption. While our model is also applicable to
public firms where managers are not diversified and sufficiently entrenched, we
ignore managerial incentives (e.g., being an empire builder), which could be
significant in determining capital structure decisions in public firms (Zwiebel
1996; Morellec 2004). A significant fraction of entrepreneurs view the nonpe-
cuniary benefits of being their own bosses as a large component of rewards. It
has also been documented that less risk-averse (see Gentry and Hubbard 2004;
De Nardi, Doctor, and Krane 2007) and more confident/optimistic individuals
are more likely to self-select into entrepreneurship.
Market incompleteness is taken exogenously in our model. Real-world cap-
ital structure decisions of entrepreneurial firms likely reflect agency frictions
and informational asymmetries leading markets to be endogenously incom-
plete and ownership to be concentrated. For example, DeMarzo and Fishman
(2007), DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), and DeMarzo, Fishman, He, andWang
(2009) derive optimal recursive contracts in settings where entrepreneurs face
dynamic moral hazard issues. The optimal contracts derived in these papers
can be implemented via concentrated insider ownership and credit lines. Our
model also does not feature endogenous financial constraints. Moral-hazard–
based contracting models (such as those mentioned above) naturally generate
endogenous financial constraints. We view endogenously incomplete markets
as a complementary perspective and an important direction to extend our article,
which can have fundamental implications such as promotion of entrepreneur-
ship and contract design.
Appendix
A. Market Valuation and Capital Structure of a Public Firm
Well-diversified owners of a public firm face complete markets. Given the Sharpe ratio η of the
market portfolio and the risk-free rate r , there exists a unique stochastic discount factor (SDF)
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(ξt : t ≥ 0) (see Duffie 2001) satisfying
dξt = −rξt dt − ηξt d Bt , ξ0 = 1. (A1)
Using this SDF, we can derive the market value of the unlevered firm, A (y) , the market value of
equity, E (y), and the market value of debt, D (y). The market value of the firm is equal to the sum
of equity value and debt value:
V (y) = E (y)+ D (y) . (A2)
Under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, we can rewrite the dynamics of the revenue y
in Equation (1) as follows:
dyt = νyt dt + ωyt dBQt + ²yt d Zt , (A3)
where ν is the risk-adjusted drift defined by ν ≡ μ− ωη, and BQt is a standard Brownian motion
under Q satisfying dBQt = dBt + ηdt .
A.1 Valuation of an Unlevered Public Firm
Throughout the appendix, we derive our results assuming that there is a flow operating cost z for
running the project. The operating cost z generates operating leverage, and hence the option to
abandon the firm has positive value. The results reported in this article are for the case z = 0.
Appendix D.2 provides results for the case z > 0.
We start with the after-tax unlevered firm value A (y), which satisfies the following differen-
tial equation:
r A (y) = (1− τm ) (y − z)+ νyA′ (y)+ 12σ
2y2A′′ (y) . (A4)
This is a second-order ordinary differential equation (ODE). We need two boundary conditions to
obtain a solution. One boundary condition describes the behavior of A (y) when y → ∞. This
condition rules out speculative bubbles. To ensure that A (y) is finite, we assume r > ν throughout
the article. The other boundary condition is related to abandonment. As in the standard option
exercise models, the firm is abandoned whenever the cash flow process hits a threshold value ya
for the first time. At the threshold ya , the following value-matching condition is satisfied:
A (ya) = 0, (A5)
because we normalize the outside value to zero. For the abandonment threshold ya to be optimal,
the following smooth-pasting condition must also be satisfied:
A′ (ya) = 0. (A6)
Solving Equation (A4) and using the no-bubble condition and boundary conditions (A5) and (A6),
we obtain
A (y) = (1− τm )
[(
y
r − ν −
z
r
)
−
(
ya
r − ν −
z
r
)(
y
ya
)θ1]
, (A7)
where the abandonment threshold ya is given in
ya = r − ν
r
θ1
θ1 − 1 z, (A8)
where
θ1 = −σ−2
(
ν − σ 2/2
)
−
√
σ−4
(
ν − σ 2/2)2 + 2rσ−2 < 0. (A9)
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A.2 Valuation of a Levered Public Firm
First, consider the market value of equity. Let yd be the corresponding default threshold. After de-
fault, equity is worthless, in that E(y) = 0 for y ≤ yd . This gives us the value-matching condition
E (yd ) = 0. Before default, equity value E (y) satisfies the following differential equation:
r E (y) = (1− τm ) (y − z − b)+ νyE ′ (y)+ 12σ
2y2E ′′ (y) , y ≥ yd . (A10)
When y →∞, E (y) also satisfies a no-bubble condition. Solving this ODE and using the bound-
ary conditions, we obtain
E (y; yd ) = (1− τm )
[(
y
r − ν −
z + b
r
)
−
(
yd
r − ν −
z + b
r
)(
y
yd
)θ1]
. (A11)
Equation (A11) shows that equity value is equal to the after-tax present value of profit flows minus
the present value of the perpetual coupon payments plus an option value to default. The term
(y/yd )θ1 may be interpreted as the price of an Arrow-Debreu security contingent on the event of
default. The optimal default threshold satisfies the smooth-pasting condition,
∂E (y)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=yd
= 0, (A12)
which gives
y∗d =
r − ν
r
θ1
θ1 − 1 (z + b) . (A13)
After debt is in place, there is a conflict between equityholders and debtholders. Equityholders
choose the default threshold yd to maximize equity value E(y; yd ).
The market value of debt before default satisfies the following differential equation:
r D (y) = b + νyD′ (y)+ 1
2
σ 2y2D′′ (y) , y ≥ yd . (A14)
The value-matching condition is given by
D (yd ) = αA (yd ) . (A15)
We also impose a no-bubble condition when y →∞. Solving the valuation equation, we have
D (y) = b
r
−
[
b
r
− αA (yd )
](
y
yd
)θ1
. (A16)
For a given coupon rate b and default threshold yd , using Equation (A2), we may write the
market value of the levered firm value V (y; yd ) as follows:
V (y; yd ) = A (y)+ τmb
r
[
1−
(
y
yd
)θ1]− (1− α) A (yd )( yyd
)θ1
. (A17)
Equation (A17) shows that the levered market value of the firm is equal to the after-tax unlevered
firm value plus the present value of tax shields minus bankruptcy costs.
While y∗d is chosen to maximize E(y), coupon b is chosen to maximize ex ante firm value
V (y). Substituting Equation (A13) into Equation (A17) and using the following first-order
condition,
∂V (y0)
∂b
= 0, (A18)
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we obtain the optimal coupon rate b∗ as a function of y0. We also verify that the second-order
condition is satisfied.
Now consider the special case without operating cost (z = 0). First, from Equation (A7), the
value of an unlevered public firm becomes
A (y) = (1− τm )
[
y
r − ν −
ya
r − ν
(
y
ya
)θ1]
. (A19)
For a levered public firm, we have an explicit expression for the optimal coupon:
b∗ = y0 r
r − ν
θ1 − 1
θ1
(
1− θ1 − (1− α) (1− τm ) θ1
τm
)1/θ1
. (A20)
Substituting Equations (A13) and (A20) into Equation (A17), we obtain the following expression
for V ∗ (y), the firm value when debt coupon is optimally chosen:
V ∗(y) =
[
1− τm + τm
(
1− θ1 − (1− α) (1− τm ) θ1
τm
)1/θ1] y
r − ν . (A21)
Notice that this firm value formula applies only at the moment of debt issuance and will be equal
to firm value when the entrepreneur cashes out.
B. Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 2. Thus, we prove the results in only the general case
where the entrepreneur has partial ownership ψ of the firm.
After exit (via default or cashing out), the entrepreneur solves the standard complete-markets
consumption/portfolio choice problem (Merton 1971). The entrepreneur’s value function Je (x) is
given by the following explicit form:
Je (x) = − 1
γ r
exp
[
−γ r
(
x + η
2
2γ r2
+ δ − r
γ r2
)]
. (B1)
Before exit, the entrepreneur faces incomplete markets. Using the principle of optimality, we
claim that the entrepreneur’s value function J s (x, y) satisfies the HJB Equation (10). The first-
order conditions for consumption c and portfolio allocation φ are given by Equations (11–12).
We conjecture that J s (x, y) takes the following exponential form:
J s (x, y) = − 1
γ r
exp
[
−γ r
(
x + ψG (y)+ η
2
2γ r2
+ δ − r
γ r2
)]
. (B2)
As shown in Miao and Wang (2007), G(y) is the entrepreneur’s certainty equivalent wealth per
unit of the entrepreneur’s inside equity of the firm. Under this conjectured value function, it is
easy to show that the optimal consumption rule and the portfolio rule are given by Equations (26)
and (27), respectively. Substituting these expressions back into the HJB Equation (10) gives the
differential Equation (28) for G (y).
We now turn to the boundary conditions. First, consider the lower default boundary. Since
equity is worthless at default, the entrepreneur’s financial wealth x does not change immediately
after default. In addition, the entrepreneur’s value function should remain unchanged at the mo-
ment of default. That is, the following value-matching condition holds at the default boundary
yd (x):
J s (x, yd (x)) = Je(x). (B3)
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In general, the default boundary depends on the entrepreneur’s wealth level. Because the
default boundary is optimally chosen, the following smooth-pasting conditions at y = yd (x)must
be satisfied:21
∂ J s (x, y)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
y=yd (x)
= ∂ J
e (x)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
y=yd (x)
(B4)
∂ J s (x, y)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=yd (x)
= ∂ J
e (x)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=yd (x).
(B5)
These two conditions equate the marginal value of wealth and the marginal value of revenue before
and after default.
At the instant of cashing out, the entrepreneur retires debt at par, pays fixed cost K , and sells
his firm for V ∗(y) given in Equation (A17). We assume that the shares owned by existing equity
holders are converted one-for-one into the shares of the new firm. Then the entrepreneur pays
capital gains taxes on the sale. His wealth xTu immediately after cashing out satisfies
xTu = xTu− + ψV ∗
(
yTu
)− F0 − K − τg (ψV ∗ (yTu )− K − (I − (1− ψ)E0)) . (B6)
The entrepreneur’s value function at the payout boundary yu(x) satisfies the following value-
matching condition:
J s (x, yu(x)) = Je
(
x + ψV ∗ (yu(x))− F0 − K − τg
(
ψV ∗ (yu(x))− K − (I − (1− ψ)E0)
))
.
(B7)
The entrepreneur’s optimality implies the following smooth-pasting conditions at y = yu (x):
∂ J s (x, y)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
y=yu(x) (B8)
= ∂ J
e
(
x + ψV ∗ (y)− F0 − K − τg
(
ψV ∗ (y)− K − (I − (1− ψ)E0)
))
∂x
∣∣∣∣
y=yu(x)
∂ J s (x, y)
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=yu(x) (B9)
= ∂ J
e
(
x + ψV ∗ (y)− F0 − K − τg
(
ψV ∗ (y)− K − (I − (1− ψ)E0)
))
∂y
∣∣∣∣
y=yu(x).
Using the conjectured value function (B2), we show that the default and cash-out bound-
aries yd (x) and yu (x) are independent of wealth. We thus simply use yd and yu to denote the
default and cash-out thresholds, respectively. Using the value-matching and smooth-pasting con-
ditions (B3–B5) at yd , we obtain Equations (29) and (30). Similarly, using the value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions (B7–B9) at yu , we have Equations (31) and (32).
Finally, we characterize the entrepreneur’s investment and financing decision at t = 0. Let x
denote the entrepreneur’s endowment of financial wealth. If the entrepreneur chooses to start his
business, his financial wealth x0 immediately after financing is
x0 = x − (I − F0 − (1− ψ)E0). (B10)
At time 0, the entrepreneur chooses a coupon rate b and equity share ψ to solve the following
problem:
max
b,ψ
J s
(
x + F0 + (1− ψ)E0 − I, y0
)
, (B11)
21 See Krylov (1980), Dumas (1991), and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for details on the smooth-pasting conditions.
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subject to the requirement that outside debt and equity are competitively priced, i.e., F0 = F (y0),
and E0 = E0 (y0). In Appendix C, we provide explicit formulas for F (y) and E0 (y).
The entrepreneur will decide to launch the project if his value function from the project (under
the optimal capital structure) is higher than the value function without the project,
max
b
J s
(
x + F0 + (1− ψ)E0 − I, y0
)
> Je
(
x
)
. (B12)
C. Market Values of Outside Debt and Equity
When the entrepreneur neither defaults nor cashes out, the market value of his debt F (y) satisfies
the following ODE:
r F (y) = b + νyF ′ (y)+ 1
2
σ 2y2F ′′ (y) , yd ≤ y ≤ yu . (C1)
At the default trigger yd , debt recovers the fraction α of after-tax unlevered firm value, in that
F (yd ) = αA (yd ) . At the cash-out trigger yu , debt is retired and recovers its face value, in that
F (yu) = F0. Solving Equation (C1) subject to these boundary conditions gives
F (y) = b
r
+
(
F0 − b
r
)
q(y)+
[
αA (yd )− b
r
]
q(y), (C2)
where
q(y) = y
θ1 yθ2d − yθ2 y
θ1
d
yθ1u y
θ2
d − y
θ2
u y
θ1
d
, (C3)
q(y) = y
θ2 yθ1u − yθ1 yθ2u
yθ1u y
θ2
d − y
θ2
u y
θ1
d
. (C4)
Here, θ1 is given by Equation (A9) and
θ2 = −σ−2
(
ν − σ 2/2
)
+
√
σ−4
(
ν − σ 2/2)2 + 2rσ−2 > 1. (C5)
Equation (C2) admits an intuitive interpretation. It states that debt value is equal to the present
value of coupon payments plus the changes in value when default occurs and when cash-out oc-
curs. Note that q(y) can be interpreted as the present value of a dollar if cash-out occurs before de-
fault, and q(y) can be interpreted as the present value of a dollar if the entrepreneur goes bankrupt
before cash-out. Using F0 = F (y0), we have that the initial debt issuance is given by
F0 = b
r
−
(
b
r
− αA (yd )
) q(y0)
1− q(y0) . (C6)
Similarly, for the outside equity claim, we have the following valuation equation:
r E0 (y) = (1− τe) (y − z − b)+ νyE ′0 (y)+
1
2
σ 2y2E ′′0 (y) , yd ≤ y ≤ yu , (C7)
subject to the following boundary conditions:
E0 (yu) = V ∗ (yu) , (C8)
E0 (yd ) = 0. (C9)
Solving the above valuation equation, we have that the value of outside equity E0(y) is given by
E0 (y) = (1− τe)
(
y
r − ν −
z + b
r
)
+
[
V ∗ (yu)− (1− τe)
(
yu
r − ν −
z + b
r
)]
q(y)
− (1− τe)
(
yd
r − ν −
z + b
r
)
q(y). (C10)
The initial outside equity issuance E0 is then given by E0 = E0 (y0).
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D. Capital Gains Taxes and Operating Leverage
First, we analyze the case where the capital gains tax is zero. Then, we extend the baseline model
to allow for operating leverage.
D.1 Effects of Capital Gains Taxes
In the presence of capital gains taxes with τg = 10%, the benefit from cash-out falls. Table D1
shows that the 10-year cash-out probability decreases, and the entrepreneur takes on more debt in
order to diversify idiosyncratic risk. However, the quantitative effects are small in our numerical
example. We may understand the intuition from the value-matching condition (18). At the cash-out
threshold yu , when ψ = 1, the entrepreneur obtains less value
(
1− τg
)
V ∗ (yu), but enjoys tax
rebate τg (K + I ). Thus, these two effects partially offset each other, making the effect of capital
gains taxes small. Clearly, if the cash-out value is sufficiently large relative to the cash-out and
investment costs, then the effect of the capital gains tax should be large.
D.2 Effects of Operating Leverage
How does operating leverage affect an entrepreneurial firm’s financial leverage? Intuitively, oper-
ating leverage increases financial distress risk, and thus should limit debt financing. The top panel
of Table D2 confirms this intuition for the complete-markets case (the limiting case with γ → 0).
Table D1
Capital structure of entrepreneurial firms: capital gains taxes
Public Private Private Private Credit 10-Yr default 10-Yr cash-out
Coupon debt equity firm leverage (%) spread (bp) probability (%) probability (%)
b F0 G0 S0 L0 CS pd (10) pu (10)
Panel A: τe = 0, τg = 0
γ = 1 0.11 3.20 19.95 23.14 13.8 32 0.0 12.3
γ = 2 0.42 10.11 10.36 20.47 49.4 115 1.9 24.1
Panel B: τe = τm , τg = 0
γ = 1 0.54 12.29 9.92 22.22 55.3 138 3.9 15.5
γ = 2 0.66 13.57 6.47 20.04 67.7 186 9.8 26.8
This table reports the results for the setting where there are no capital gains taxes (τg = 0). We report results
for two business income tax rates (τe = 0 or τe = τm (11.29%)) and two levels of risk aversion (γ = 1, 2). The
remaining parameters are reported in Section 4. All the results are for initial revenue y0 = 1.
Table D2
The effects of operating leverage: the case of debt financing and cash-out option
Public Private Private Private Credit 10-Yr default 10-Yr cash-out
Coupon debt equity firm leverage (%) spread (bp) probability (%) probability (%)
b F0 G0 S0 L0 CS pd (10) pu (10)
Panel A: γ → 0
z = 0.2 0.35 8.03 16.73 24.76 32.4 132 2.2 0.0
z = 0.4 0.33 6.72 13.40 20.12 33.4 194 6.2 0.0
Panel B: γ = 1
z = 0.2 0.59 10.94 6.34 17.28 63.3 237 14.1 13.1
z = 0.4 0.62 9.41 3.98 13.39 70.3 356 28.4 13.5
Panel C: γ = 2
z = 0.2 0.73 11.95 3.57 15.53 77.0 315 26.9 23.7
z = 0.4 0.84 10.48 1.57 12.05 86.9 503 50.6 22.3
This table reports the results for the setting where there is operating leverage. We report results for two levels of
operating cost (z = 0.2, 0.4). The remaining parameters are reported in Section 4. All the results are for initial
revenue y0 = 1.
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As the operating cost z increases from 0.2 to 0.4, the 10-year default probability rises from 2.2%
to 6.2%, and the firm issues less debt. On the other hand, equity value also decreases because
operating costs lower the operating profits. As a result, the effect on financial leverage ratio is
ambiguous. In our numerical examples, this ratio increases with operating costs.
Our analysis above shows that risky debt has important diversification benefits for entrepre-
neurial firms. This effect may dominate the preceding “crowding-out” effect of operating leverage.
In Table D2, as z increases from 0.2 to 0.4, an entrepreneur with γ = 1 raises debt with increased
coupon payments from 0.59 to 0.62. However, the market value of debt decreases because both the
10-year default probability and the cash-out probability increase with z. The private equity value
also decreases with z, and this effect dominates the decrease in debt value. Thus, the private lever-
age ratio rises with operating costs. This result also holds true for a more risk-averse entrepreneur
with γ = 2. Notice that the more risk-averse entrepreneur relies more on risky debt to diversify
risk. The 10-year default probability increases substantially from 26.9% to 50.6% for γ = 2, but
the 10-year cash-out probability decreases from 23.7% to 22.3%.
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